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Abstract 
QoS and Security are necessary features for wide deployment of wireless ad hoc networks. 
Existing ad hoc networks provide little support for them. In this paper, we have proposed a 
mathematical model for improving both QoS and Security. We also present a model that 
takes into account the number of nodes, the Poisson packet arrival process and service 
process. Here, wireless ad hoc networks are modeled as M/M/1/Q queuing networks and the 
expressions for the packet loss rate and packet delivery ratio are evaluated. The mean service 
time of nodes is evaluated and used to obtain the packet delivery ratio. The analytical results 
are verified by simulations and numerical computations. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Security is an essential service for network 
communications. In a wired network, the 
transmission medium can be physically 
secured and access to the network can be 
easily controlled. The risks to users of 
wireless technology have increased as the 
service has become more popular. 
Traditional security mechanisms are 
generally not suitable for wireless ad hoc 
network because of limited bandwidth and 
limited battery lifetime. Hence new 
security models or mechanisms that are 
suitable for wireless ad hoc network must 
be designed to avoid or mitigate the 
behavior to the networks.  
 
In a QoS context, security is not 
sufficiently discussed in ad hoc networks 
research. Mathematical modeling of 
quality of service security model of ad hoc 
networking aims at improving the security 
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in networks with optimal QoS. Due to the 
open Medium, eavesdropping is easier in 
wireless ad hoc networks than in wired 
networks. Dynamically changing network 
topology allows any malicious node to join 
the network without being detected. 
Absence of any centralized infrastructure 
prohibits any monitoring node in the 
system. As described by Dmitri et al. 
providing QoS in a wireless ad hoc 
network is especially challenging due to 
the lack of fixed infrastructure, the 
limitations of the wireless channel, and the 
limited resources of the nodes [1]. 
According to RFC2386 given by Crawley 
et al. QoS is a set of service requirements 
to be met by the network while 
transporting an information flow [2]. The 
basic requirement of any QoS mechanism 
is a measurable performance metric. 
 
Typical QoS metrics include available 
bandwidth, packet loss rate, average end to 
end delay and packet jitter [3]. QoS can be 
achieved by utilizing the network 
resources such as bandwidth and buffers 
efficiently by means of rate control and 
admission control. QoS metrics, such as 
end-to-end delay, packet loss rate and 
throughput of communication are 
influenced by security services. In this 
paper, we concentrate on packet loss rate 
which is one of the important QoS factors. 
In a distributed ad hoc network, a node’s 
available bandwidth is decided by both 
channel bandwidth and also by its 
neighbor’s bandwidth usage. Thus, 
bandwidth estimation is a fundamental 
function that is needed to provide QoS in 
ad hoc networks. However, bandwidth 
estimation is extremely difficult, because 
each node has lack of knowledge of the 
network status and links change 
dynamically.  
 
Among various security attacks and 
threats, wireless ad hoc networks are 
particularly prone to DoS flooding attack 
[4]. This attack aims to affect the victim by 
flooding an enormous amount of traffic to 
exhaust key resources of the network. DoS 
flooding attack will easily lead to network 
congestion. Attackers are able to conduct 
ad hoc flooding attacks by flooding either 
RREQ packets or false data packets. There 
is more research works focused on RREQ 
flooding attacks than data flooding attacks. 
RREQ flooding attacks are performed 
during the path finding phase of routing 
from the source node to the destination 
node. The data flooding attack is 
performed only after finding a path. 
Therefore, an attacker sets up a path to the 
victim node so as to conduct data flooding 
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attacks and then forwards useless data 
packets to the victim nodes along the path. 
The size of data packets is much larger 
than that of RREQ packets. Therefore, 
resource consumption and bandwidth 
congestion of a node or the entire network 
are very much increased by such attacks. 
 
In our previous work, we have proposed a 
defense scheme against a DDoS data 
flooding attack using flow monitoring 
table (FMT) [5]. According to this scheme 
sending rate of each source node is 
monitored by every intermediate node in 
the network. The proposed scheme uses 
bandwidth estimation and rate control 
mechanism to assign the sending rate. 
When a source node violates this assigned 
rate, that node is identified as the attacking 
node using Explicit Congestion 
Notification and the attacking node is 
blocked from the network. In this paper we 
develop an analytical model for the 
defense scheme proposed in and also 
develop a model to compute packet loss 
rate and packet delivery ratio [5]. We 
perform comparison between theoretical 
value and the simulated results.  
 
RELATED WORKS  
Cabrera et al. have proposed a 
methodology of utilizing a Network 
Management System for the early 
detection of Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) Attacks [6]. In their methodology, 
several key variables have been chosen 
with statistical analysis to detect the attack 
in the early stage. This scheme is effective 
only for local test bed and controlled 
traffic load. Mahajan et al. have proposed 
the aggregate-based congestion control 
(ACC) to rate-limit attack traffic [7]. The 
congested router starts with local rate 
limit, and then progressively pushes the 
rate limit to some neighbor routers and 
further out, forming a dynamic rate-limit 
tree, which can be expensive to maintain. 
The Flooding Attack Prevention scheme 
dealt by Yi et al. has addressed the 
malicious flooding attack and defense 
system [8]. They have proposed the 
neighbor suppression mechanism for the 
RREQ flooding attack and the path cut off 
mechanism for the data flooding attack. 
Avoiding Mistaken Transmission Table 
scheme dealt by Li et al. has addressed a 
defense system against the malicious 
flooding attack [9]. This scheme requires 
huge memory space and considerable 
processing time for saving the packets at 
each node. Xia et al. have dealt a scheme 
that uses the topology information and the 
public key cryptosystem to detect 
colluding malicious nodes [10]. However, 
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it is very hard to utilize the key 
management and exchange in ad hoc 
networks. Guo et al. have proposed a 
quantitative model to characterize the 
flooding attack and a model to detect 
flooding attack [11]. They have evaluated 
the number of routing control packets. 
 
ANALYTICAL MODEL FOR 
WIRELESS AD HOC NETWORK 
WITH RATE CONTROL 
As given by Chiang et al. a network is 
modeled as a set L of links with finite 
capacities LC = (cl, l € L) [12]. The link 
capacity LC is defined as the maximum 
achievable transmission rate in absence of 
competing flows. The links are shared by a 
set N of sources indexed by s. Each source 
s uses a set L(s) ⊆ L of links. Let S (l) = {s 
€ N | l € L(s)} be the set of sources using 
link l. The sets {L(s)} define an LxN 
routing matrix. 
Rls=    (1)                                                                       
Each source s is associated with its 
transmission rate xs(t) at time t, in 
packets/second.  Each link l is associated 
with a congestion measure, pl (t) ≥ 0, at 
time t.  The source node adjusts its 
transmission rate xs(t) based on the 
congestion measure, pl(t). Each source s is 
associated with an utility function Us(xs) 
which is a function of its rate xs, end to 
end delay D(p). This is a function of 
congestion measure p and packet loss rate 
L(p) which is again a function of 
congestion measure. The optimization 
problem that we wish to solve then 
becomes as specified by Amine et al. [13]. 
Maximize ∑ Us(xs)  
Subject to Rx ≤ c; x ≥ 0 
Minimize D(p) 
Subject to p ≥ 0 
And Minimize L(p) 
Subject to p ≥ 0 
 
In each period, the source rates xs(t) and 
link prices pl(t) are updated based on flow 
information. The source rates xs(t) are 
updated according to AIMD rate control. 
We assume that the sender receives a loss 
feedback from the receiver which 
implements explicit congestion 
notification mechanism at least once every 
round trip time. At the end of each round, 
the sender adjusts its congestion window 
Wi based on the loss feedback as specified 
eqn. 2 and eqn. 3. 
Wi+1(t+1) = Wi(t)+a; when f = 0             (2)                                                                                                                             
Wi+1(t+1) = Wi(t)(1- b);  when f > 0;      (3)                                                       
Where Wi is the window size of round i, a 
is the increase constant, b is the decrease 
constant, and f is the fractional packet loss. 
According to Arunmozhi et al. proposed 
scheme, we perform the rate control [5]. 
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The rate adjustment depends on the 
available bandwidth and the capacity of 
the link.  
TAssigned rate  =  Clink - Bavailable                  (4)                                                                                                                                                                   
Where TAssigned rate is the assigned 
transmission rate, Bavailable is the available 
bandwidth and Clink is the link capacity. 
Capacity of wireless networks is discussed 
by Gupta et al. [14]. 
Estimation of link capacity depends on the 
type of MAC layer used in the network.  
For estimating link capacity of IEEE 
802.11 MAC layer, Eqn. 5 is used. 
Clink  = B/T                                              (5)                                                                                                          
where B is number of bits transmitted over 
the time T. 
According to this MAC protocol, the 
time required for one packet being 
successfully transmitted over one hop is 
given by the eqn. 6, 
T = TRTS+ TCTS+ Td +TACK+3 SIFS+ DIFS            
                                                              (6)                                                                                                                                             
Where Td corresponds to the transmission 
time of a data packet, TRTS is the time 
required to send RTS frame, TCTS is the 
time required to send CTS frame, TACK is 
the time required to send ACK frame. 
 
The available bandwidth is estimated via 
neighborhood bandwidth consumption. 
That is, for any node i in a MANET, it 
shares the wireless medium with all of its 
neighbors. Thus, the total consumed 
bandwidth in i’s neighborhood, Bi,consumed, 
can be written as 
Bi,consumed = ∑ Bj (7)       
      j∊N(i) 
where N(i)={node i and all neighbors of 
i}, and Bj is the bandwidth consumed by 
all the existing connections of node j, j ∊ 
N(i). Taking the total bandwidth as Bt, 
then the available bandwidth for node i is 
computed as 
B i,available  = Bt - Bi,consumed                      (8)                                                                                                          
 
AN ANALYTICAL MODEL USED TO 
COMPUTE PACKET LOSS RATE 
AND PACKET DELIVERY RATIO IN 
THE PRESENCE OF MALICIOUS 
USERS 
DoS attacks are usually characterized by 
huge packet volumes that lead to network 
congestion and to an end system 
overloading. The proposed rate limiting
based scheme provides a solution for DoS 
attacks as a congestion control problem. 
For every node x, the packets arrive with 
rate λ and they are served at a rate µ. Nl 
and Na are the number of packets used by 
legitimate users and malicious users, 
respectively. A maximum number of both 
legitimate and malicious packets c can be 
served at the same time. All packets that 
arrive when the destination node is in a 
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saturated state will be rejected. λl and µl 
are considered for the arrivals and servings 
of legitimate packets.  λa and µa are 
considered for the arrivals and servings of 
false packets. The packet arrival process is 
the sum of two Poisson processes with 
rates λl and λa and thus also a Poisson 
process with rate λ = λl + λa. The two 
arrival processes are independent of each 
other.  DDoS flooding attack may cause 
the degradation of QoS or render the 
services unavailable to the legitimate 
users. Packets are dropped due to the 
unavailability of the bandwidth and time 
out condition. We will make the 
assumption that all incoming packets 
follow Poisson arrival process with 
exponential inter arrival times. The 
Probability Distribution Function (PDF) of 
the legitimate packet’s service time Sl(t) 
will have the form of an exponential 
distribution for t smaller than the timeout 
tout, followed by an appropriately weighted 
delta Dirac function at tout 
Sl(t)  =                  (9)                                                                                                                                                                      
Where Po =  dt =e 
–tout
       (10)                                                     
The mean service time and the service rate 
for legitimate packets are 
tl                                           (11)                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
and   µl =  =                            (12)                                                                                                                                                                       
Normally, the attacker might want to 
follow the legitimate arrivals process in 
order to prevent certain time analysis 
detection methods. Concerning the 
malicious packet service process, the 
strategy of the attacker is to exhaust the 
resources using the smallest effort 
possible. As specified by Boteanu et al. we 
take the malicious packet’s service rate as 
µa =    [15]. The utilization factor is 
defined as the ratio between the arrival rate 
and service rate. Let the utilization factor 
of the legitimate users be ρl = λl/µl, and the 
utilization factor of attacker be ρa = λa/µa. 
The overall utilization is computed by 
approximating the overall mean service 
time . We consider  to be constant in time 
and equal to the average of the mean 
legitimate service time tl and mean 
attacker’s service time ta weighted by the 
legitimate utilization factor and the 
attacker’s utilization factor respectively.  
ρ =  =   . tl +  . tout                    (13)                                                                                                                                                                                            
The mean service rate is  
 =  =                                  (14)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
When the flooding attack is launched, 
large amount of attack traffic is sent to the 
network, which will easily lead to network 
congestion. During the malicious 
congestion, network nodes have to buffer 
more and more legitimate packets before 
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they find the shared wireless channel is 
free. As more and more attack traffic is 
sent, node's buffer will easily overflow, 
which may lead to packet dropping. Hence 
we may say that flooding attack is the 
direct consequence of packet loss rate. 
Queue based analysis of DoS attack has 
been presented by Aissani et al. [16]. 
 
Our network is modeled as M/M/1/Ql 
queue model similar to that of Pham et al. 
[17]. The maximum number of packets 
that can be accommodated in the queue at 
any time is given by K < ∞. Those packets 
that arrive when K packets are already 
present in the system are discarded. The 
probability that node x has k packets in its 
queue [Pk(x)] is computed using Eqn. 15. 
Pk(x)    (15)                                                                                                                                                          
Here,  is the traffic experienced by 
a node x and η is the node’s packet 
processing rate. Packets are discarded 
when the queue is full, i.e., K=Ql. Hence, 
the probability of packet lost due to the 
congestion, Ploss(x) becomes, 
Ploss(x) = PQl(x) =        (16)                                                                                                                                                                            
Hence, the packet loss rate Lloss(x) due to 
the congestion can be computed using eqn. 
17.  
Lloss(x) =T(x) . Ploss(x) =  (17)                                                                                                                                      
The overall packet loss rate Lloss in the 
network due to N nodes is then given by 
eqn.18. 
Lloss=                                   (18)                                                                                                                                                                                   
When congestion happens, both normal 
packets and attack packets are lost. In 
other words, the overall packet loss rate 
Lloss includes both normal packets loss rate 
and false packets loss rate. This Lloss eqn.  
is used to estimate the normal packet loss 
rate as Lloss-normal .  
Lloss-normal
 
 = Lloss .                               (19)                                                                                                                                                                                       
This normal packet loss rate Lloss-normal is 
used to compute attack packets loss rate 
Lloss-attacker and the packet delivery ratio 
PDR.   Eqns. 20 & 21 are used to compute 
both Lloss-attacker  and PDR. 
Lloss-attacker = Lloss - Lloss-normal
 
 = Lloss  
                                                              (20)                                                                                                                                          
and PDR =    %          (21)                                                                                                                                                                  
Here, C is number of flows in the network 
and  is the packet’s sending rate of each 
flow. 
  
EVALUATION OF THE MODEL FOR 
COMPUTING PACKET LOSS RATE 
AND PACKET DELIVERY RATIO 
We have evaluated our network model 
with theoretical results and simulated 
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results.  The ad hoc network is formed 
with 20 nodes. Constant Bit Rate traffic is 
taken for analysis. The size of data packet 
is 512 bytes. The evaluation is performed 
in two different scenarios. In the first 
scenario, five data flows with randomly 
selected sources and destinations are 
considered. The node’s packet processing 
rate is taken as 4 packets/s. The queue size 
is 50 packets/s.  The source node transmits 
data packets at the rate from 1 packet/s to 
10 packets/s. The attack rate is 5 packets/s. 
The PDR is computed using Eqn. 21.  In 
the second scenario, Each source transmits 
data packets at the rate of 2 packets/s. 
 
The attack rate is varied from 1packet/s to 
10 packets/s. All the other parameters are 
as similar to that of the first case. The PDR 
for this case is again computed. The 
computation of PDR is described with an 
example. The packet’s arrival rate is 2 
packet/s and No. of flows is 5, the traffic 
experienced T(x) by a node x is then 10 
packets/s. Taking Queue length Ql as 50 
packets/s and node’s packet processing 
rate as 4 packets/s, the probability of 
packet lost is computed using Eqn. 16. 
Ploss(x) = =      =  0.6 
Then, the packet loss rate Lloss(x) is 
computed using Eqn. 17 as Lloss(x) = 
10x0.6 = 6 packets/s. Thus the  overall 
packet loss rate Lloss in the network due to 
20 nodes is 20x6 = 120 packets/s. Taking 
utilization factor of legitimate user ρl as 2 
packets/s and utilization factor of 
malicious user as 5 packets/s, the normal 
packet loss rate is computed using Eqn. 19, 
as Lloss-normal
 
 =  120 .   = 34.28 
packets/s. Finally, PDR is computed using 
Eqn. 21 as PDR =   = 82. 
85% 
The network is simulated with the same 
parameters using NS2 network simulator. 
Figures 1 and 2 are used to compare the 
theoretical and simulated values of PDR.  
 
Fig. 1: Packet Delivery Ratio vs. Sending 
Rate. 
 
From Figure 1, it is observed that packet 
delivery ratio is 96.6% when the source 
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node transmits data at a rate of 1 packet/s 
and most packets get to the destination 
nodes. However, the packet delivery ratio 
reduces to 0.09% when the source node 
transmits data at a rate of 10 packets/s. In 
Figure 2, it is observed that packet 
delivery ratio is 81.66% when an intruder 
transmits attack packet at a rate of 1 
packet/s. It is also seen that packet 
delivery ratio decreases as the attack rate is 
increased. It is finally observed that PDR 
of simulation is closer to our theoretical 
results. This validates our theoretical 
model. However, the simulated values in 
each case are slightly lower compared to 
the theoretical values. This is due to the 
fact that, collision is also taken into 
account in addition to congestion for 
simulation.  
 
Fig. 2: Packet Delivery Ratio vs. Attack 
Rate. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we analyze the packet loss 
rate and packet delivery ratio in wireless 
ad hoc networks with stationary nodes in 
wireless ad hoc networks. An analytical 
model for a wireless ad hoc network is 
proposed. This provides improved QoS 
based on rate control. A model which is 
used to compute packet loss rate and 
packet delivery ratio with DDoS flooding 
attack has also been developed. The 
evaluation of the model is performed with 
theoretical results and the simulated 
results. It is observed that packet delivery 
ratio of simulation results and theoretical 
results are closer to each other and the 
simulated values are slightly lower 
compared to theoretical values due to 
collision factors considered in simulation. 
In our future work, we develop the models 
for our system based on other QoS metrics 
such as end to end delay and throughput. 
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